In this paper we present a dynamic model of cooperative production with human capital accumulation. We assume CES preferences on consumption and leisure in each period. When agents do not care about future generations, sustained growth occurs i¤ the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is larger or equal than one. Meritocracy always has a positive e¤ect on output, but when the elasticity of substitution is less than one, is only a level e¤ect. When agents care about future generations, under Cobb-Douglas preferences in each period and some extra conditions, there is constant growth at a rate that is larger than the one when future generations do not count. For any discount rate between generations, there is a unique level of meritocracy for which e¢ ciency is achieved.
Introduction
The theory of cooperative production studies an economy in which workers o¤er their labor to a production center (the coop). The forerunners of this theory were Ward (1958) who imagined an ideal ("Illyrian") world, Vanek (1970) who focussed on connecting the theory with the cooperative movement and Sen (1966) , who modeled the coop as a sharing rule to distribute the output. 1 Later on, Moulin (1987) , Romer and Silvestre (1993)) provided foundations for di¤erent sharing rules. In this paper, we follow Sen's approach. The (impossible) goal of the theory of cooperative production is to mimic the theory of markets with pro…t maximizing …rms by o¤ering a detailed study of all the possible outcomes. In this (grand) research picture the theory of cooperative production lags in dynamic models that illustrate the engines and the consequences of growth. Our paper is addressed to explore these questions.
Our model is very simple. Agents are identical in all respects: preferences, labor endowments, and the human capital (capital in the sequel) inherited in the …rst period from their ancestors. 2 They care about consumption and leisure. Each individual produces her own capital using the inherited capital and labor. Output is produced by capital and it is distributed according to a sharing rule. Finally, individuals consume and die, leaving to their successors the human/social capital they have accumulated.
The coop is composed of a large number of individuals, capital is the product of the inherited capital and labor, the utility function is CES, the production function has constant elasticity and the sharing rule is a weighted average of the proportional and the egalitarian sharing rules. There are 6 parameters in our model:
1. Initial conditions: capital in the initial period.
2. Productivity: the returns to scale in the production of consumption.
3. Degree of meritocracy: the weight of the proportional sharing rule in the sharing rule. 4 . Taste for consumption: the weight of consumption versus leisure. 5 . Substitutability between consumption and leisure: the elasticity of substitution.
6. Labor endowment. 1 Illyrian has been often used in the literature to represent an ideal world: "Shakespeare's Illyria is a fantasy land of make-believe and illusion" (Shakespeare, p. 169, 1993) or even a scienti…c Utopia (Beckett, 2003) . 2 Another interpretation of capital is that refers to social capital, see Dasgupta (2002) .
Our main task will be to identify the role of these variables in the dynamic equilibrium of our model.
We focus on the case in which, along the equilibrium path, agents make a positive e¤ort. This is always the case if the elasticity of substitution is less or equal to one. If the elasticity is greater than one this requires a certain bound on how increasing are the returns to scale.
We start our analysis by considering the limit case in which agents do not care about future generations. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences (i.e. when the elasticity of substitution equals to one) we show that capital grows at a constant rate. This rate depends positively on the taste of consumption and the degree of meritocracy because both encourage e¤ort which in turn produces more capital.
For any other value of the elasticity of substitution, there is a steady state value of capital. When the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are complements), the steady state is stable, i.e. growth eventually disappears. This is explained by the fact that consumption is a poor substitute of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order to take full advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which dampens growth. The value of capital at steady state depends positively on the degree of meritocracy and the taste of consumption.
If the elasticity of substitution is larger than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are substitutes), capital at the steady state depends negatively on meritocracy and the taste of consumption. This may sound paradoxical, but it is explained by the fact that the steady state is now unstable. Thus, given the initial stock of capital, more meritocracy/taste for consumption may boost the economy from negative to positive growth. In this case, when human capital grows, leisure is advantageously replaced by consumption, so unbounded growth is now possible.
We then consider a more general set up in which individuals care about future generations and they maximize a discounted sum of utilities. 3 Due to the technical di¢ culties we focus in the case in which preferences are Cobb-Douglas. We show that when future generations do not count much, there is a solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in which the growth rate is constant. Such a rate does not exist for certain values of the parameters, but when it does, is larger than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact that when future counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates growth. As before, 3 Thus the appoach developed above is a special case in which the discount factor is zero.
meritocracy encourages work which produces human capital, which makes the economy grow.
Finally, we study e¢ ciency. Too much meritocracy encourages too much work because e¤ort not only increases the agent's capital but increases her share. On the other hand, too little meritocracy encourages free riding. This suggests that there is an optimal degree of meritocracy and Sen (1966) proved that this is indeed the case: the optimal degree of meritocracy is achieved when the weight of the proportional sharing rule equals the elasticity of output with respect to capital. We prove that Sen's result, which corresponds to a static economy without capital accumulation, holds in our framework.
The role of human capital in models of growth with pro…t maximizing …rms has been stressed from di¤erent angles. Uzawa (1965) presented the …rst model, to the best of our knowledge, in which human capital played a central role in growth. But it is fair to say that this topic caught …re only after the in ‡uential paper by Lucas (1988) . The modern literature is enormous, see Acemoglu (2008), chapter 10 for a survey. From the empirical point of view, the interest in human capital stems from the highly in ‡uential paper by Barro (1991) which showed that growth is correlated with the initial value of human capital. See Lucas (2015) for a new model of the role of human capital in growth. These models share with our's the assumption that human capital can be accumulated without bound and without diminishing returns in the production of capital. But as far as we can tell, there is no correlate in this literature to our results linking preferences and growth because in all the above models, leisure does not play any role. But constant growth due to human capital is possible as in our model, see Lucas (1988) , pp. 21-25. In the latter, socially optimal and equilibrium paths diverge, as they do in our model. But there is no "exogenous" variable (the meritocratic parameter in our model) that can used to minimize welfare losses.
The Model and Preliminary Results
Time is countable in…nite. There are n families (dynasties) with a member alive in each period.
An individual alive in period t from the family i receives from her predecessor a capital of H Let H t = P n j=1 H t j be the aggregate capital at period t. Note that given (2.1), ! > 1 is essential here to allow for capital growth.
The assumption that human capital is produced by inputs that enter in a multiplicative form has been used in many models of endogenous growth since the pioneering work of Uzawa (1965) , see e.g. Lucas (1988, p. 18 ). This multiplicative form has the strong implication that if one of its terms is zero, it is impossible to produce human capital. A form like H t i = (H t 1 i + a)(l t i + b), a; b > 0 would be preferable. In this case capital does not fully depreciate even when the e¤ort is zero. Unfortunately, this formulae does not yield a tractable model. We may think of (2.1) as an approximation of this more realistic production function when a and b are small.
The consumption good is produced by means of capital represented by the production function (H t ) : We have decreasing/constant/increasing returns to scale as long as is less, equal or larger than one.
The consumption of each individual, c t i ; is determined by a sharing rule which is written as follows
When = 1 the sharing rule allocates consumption proportional to relative capital and when = 0 the sharing rule allocates consumption in a totally egalitarian manner. The parameter is the weight attached to the relative contribution of a particular agent to the aggregate capital and we refer to it as the degree of meritocracy. Kang (1988) showed that (2.2) for n > 2, is the unique di¤erentiable sharing rule which is symmetric and homogeneous of degree zero (i.e. independent of the units in which capital is measured). Moulin (1987) An individual alive in period t from the family i derives utility from consumption, c t i ; and leisure, ! l t i ; represented by a CES utility function
where s is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and labor. When s ! 1, the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. When s ! 1 utility is linear in consumption and leisure. When s ! 0, the utility function tends to be Leontie¤. We refer to as the taste for consumption.
The life of an individual, say i, is simple. She inherits H t 1 i capital and she chooses consumption and leisure in order to maximize her utility function subject to (2.1), and (2.2). Throughout the paper, we will assume that when an individual maximizes her utility she takes as given total capital, H t . This can be justi…ed when there is a very large number of individuals in the society so when an individual decides about her investment she disregards these terms. Under this assumption and (2.1), the restriction (2.2) de…nes the consumption as a linear function of labor. Thus, the maximization problem of individual i is simple and becomes
We now de…ne our equilibrium notion.
; such that for any agent i, (c t i ;l t i ) is a solution to the maximization problem (2.4) takingH t as given andH t = P n j=1 H t 1 jl t j :
We close this section showing that at each period t the short run equilibrium exists and is symmetric, and under certain conditions on the parameters of the model, the equilibrium is interior.
We o¤er the formal proofs of these preliminary results in the Appendix. Proposition 1. At every t; a short run equilibrium exists, is unique and symmetric.
That a short run equilibrium exists, is a direct consequence of the continuity of the utility as a function of l t i given that, c t i = (H t )
and the domain is a compact set (l t i 2 [0; !]). At period 1, all agents inherit the same capita, H 0 i ; and all have the same endowment of labor time. Since they take H 1 as given, all of them face the same maximization problem which has a unique solution and, therefore, they choose the same amount of labor time. Consequently, the inherited capital in period 2 is also the same for all agents, and so on. In each period, all agents inherit the same capital. 
Equilibrium paths
Along this section we assume that ( In order to analyze the equilibrium it is useful to consider the Lagrange function associated to (2.4),
where t i is the Lagrange multiplier. Since we assume that the parameters of the model are such that the equilibrium is interior, the …rst order conditions give us the maximum.
Denoting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as M i (c t i ; ! l t i ) we have that
For a CES utility function, we have that
Combining (3.1) and (3.2),
Since all individuals are identical, in an interior symmetric equilibrium, H
We will refer to (3.4) as the transition function, that de…nes an equilibrium path of the human capital.
We start analyzing the case of a linear transition function.
Equilibrium paths with a linear transition function
The transition function is linear i¤ the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. In this case, the transition (3.4) can be written as:
The growth rate is given by
The growth rate is constant, and it is positive i¤ (! 1) > 1. It increases with labor endowments (so countries rich in endowments tend to grow faster than countries poor in endowments); in the taste of consumption (so consumerism is good for growth because incentivizes hard work) and the degree of meritocracy (meritocracy encourages hard work). Returns to scale ( ) do not play any role. As noted before, full egalitarianism ( = 0) destroys the whole economy in a single period!. Since H t =H t 1 = l t i ; g t = l t i 1 and from (3.5) we see that each individual makes an e¤ort proportional ( =(1 + )) to her endowment of labor time. This proportion increases with the taste of consumption and the degree of meritocracy.
Equilibrium paths with a non linear transition function
When s 6 = 1; the transition function has a unique …xed point,Ĥ, di¤erent from zero given bŷ
Note that the assumption that ! > 1 implies that the …xed point is positive.
The following propositions states the properties of the transition function aroundĤ: The formal proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. The unique …xed point,Ĥ, is globally stable i¤ s < 1. Furthermore, if s < 1;Ĥ is increasing with !, , and :
When s < 1 growth …nally ends and we converge to a stationary society in which the human capitalĤ is increasing in !, and in the level of meritocracy. This is because when s < 1 consumption is a poor substitute of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order to take full advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which eventually exhausts growth. The case s > 1 in the long run is somehow similar to the Cobb-Douglas case, in particular, in the limit, the growth rate is independent of the returns to scale. But there are striking similarities.
Neither the taste of consumption nor the degree of egalitarianism play any role whatsoever in the determination of the long run growth rate, even though they play a role in the determination of H and therefore in the fact that the economy grows positively or negatively. The possibility of a positive growth depends onĤ to be small! This explains the, apparently paradoxical comparative statics results, that when s > 1;Ĥ is decreasing in !, and . This is because high initial endowments (or taste for consumption or meritocracy) makeĤ small and thus it is more likely that growth is positive! Notice that in the limit g t ' ! 1 and, given that g t = l t i 1; leisure disappears in the limit. This is due to the fact that consumption and leisure are very substitutable,
i.e. s > 1.
Finally, we note that the same assumptions that yield intuitive comparative static results yield stability. This is a familiar situation since Samuelson advanced the Correspondence Principle (1941), namely that most assumptions that are su¢ cient to insure stability of equilibrium turn out to be very useful when doing comparative statics (and uniqueness).
Dynasties
The previous approach does not take into account that individuals may care about future generations. Thus, when choosing labor they disregard the e¤ect of today's labor on tomorrow's capital.
In this section we consider a model in which each agent maximizes a utility function which is the in…nite sum of discounted utility (at rate ) namely
Now, when an individual decides on today's e¤ort takes into account today's and tomorrow's impact of this e¤ort.
Equilibrium arises from the maximization of (4.1) with the following set of constraints 
Where (4.2) is the transversality condition. Combining the …rst two equations,
Given the complexity of the di¤erence equations that characterize the optimum, we will assume that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, namely
Dividing (4.3) by @U (c 1 i ; ! l 1 i )=@l 1 i and using (4.4) we obtain
In an interior symmetric equilibrium, l t i = H t =H t 1 ; and c t i = (H t ) =n: Thus, substituting in (4.5) and simplifying we get:
Inspired by the case in which = 0, we conjecture that when > 0 and the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, human capital would grow at a constant rate, at least if is small. Our method of proof here is the familiar "propose and check", i.e., we propose a certain solution and we show that this solution ful…lls the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of an equilibrium. For a constant growth rate to be a solution, G = H t =H t 1 for all t should satisfy (4.6) and the transversality condition. This implies that G should be a solution of
The following proposition gives the conditions under which this equation has a solution. It happens that, when (4.7) has a solution, it has one or two of them, the constant growth rate solution to our problem is the smallest one when there are two. Formal details of the proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas:
i) There is constant growth rate i¤
ii) The growth rate is given by the smallest solution to the equation
The necessary and su¢ cient condition holds for su¢ ciently small. In particular, it always holds when = 0; and the growth rate coincides with the growth rate obtained with the linear transition function in Section 3, namely ! =(1 + ): Finally, we show in the following proposition how the constant growth rate varies with the parameters of the model.
Proposition 6.
The growth rate is increasing in !; and the level of meritocracy : If G > 1, the growth rate is also increasing in .
Summing up, the introduction of the future in the plans of agents has several important consequences. First, the dynamics become extremely complex. Second, in the Cobb-Douglas case, for a su¢ ciently small ; there is a solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in which the growth rate is constant. Such a rate does not exist for certain values of the parameters, but when it does, is larger than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact that when future counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates growth. The role of meritocracy is identical to the case = 0. Meritocracy encourages work which produces human capital, which makes the economy grow. For > 0 returns to scale does play a role. The larger they are, the larger is the growth rate.
E¢ ciency
We turn our attention to the relationship between e¢ ciency and equilibrium. Sen (1966) proved in a static model without capital that equilibrium and e¢ ciency can be reconciled by setting = .
The intuition is that, on the one hand an egalitarian sharing rule gives incentives to work very little.
On the other hand, meritocracy gives incentives to work more than it is socially e¢ cient because an increase in work, not only means more production, it also means that the share of the labour of the person doing this extra e¤ort increases. Thus, by balancing egalitarianism and meritocracy, e¢ ciency is achieved. We now investigate if Sen's result holds in our model. In this section we will assume that 1. 4 We say that an intertemporal allocation f(c t i ;l t i ;H t i )g 1 t=1 is feasible if for all t; It is well known that if utility functions and the production function are concave, a Pareto E¢ cient allocation maximizes the weighted sum of utilities (for some weights) under the feasible set. With this fact in hand, we state the following result whose proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. For all
0; the equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient i¤ = :
Thus, Sen's result is robust in the sense that it holds in a dynamic world with capital. Unfortunately, his original result is heavily dependent on the assumption that utility functions are identical. Working independently, Beviá and Corchón (2009) and Moulin (2010) proved that when individuals have di¤erent tastes, a completely di¤erent sharing rule has to be used. Furthermore, the production function must be polynomial.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model of accumulation of human/social capital in a cooperative. The model has interesting features like the existence of a constant growth rate in the case of CobbDouglas preferences (dynastic or not) and the possibility of accelerated growth when the elasticity of substitution is larger than one and agents do not care about future generations. We show that by equating the weight of meritocracy in the sharing rule to the elasticity of production with respect to human capital, the intertemporal allocation of resources is e¢ cient.
We hope that our paper, which, to the best of our knowledge is the …rst to deal with growth of cooperatives, stimulates more research in this area. 
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that l t i 2 [0; !], and c t i = (H t )
) is a continuous function of l t i ; and therefore a maximum exists. In fact, this maximum is unique because the second order condition of utility maximization is
where
and that we assume that when individuals maximize they take aggregate capital as given, the second term in (7.1) is zero. Given that the utility function is CES, the …rst term and the third term are negative. Thus, the maximum is unique. Finally, note that at period 1 all agents inherit the same human capital, H 0 i = H 0 j ; and since agents maximize taking aggregate capital as given, the maximization at time 1 is the same for all agents. Given that the maximization has a unique solution, equilibrium at t = 1 is symmetric, which implies that all agents in period 2 inherit the same human capital. Therefore, the equilibrium is also symmetric in period 2 and in any other subsequent period.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us see …rst thatl t i < !: Given that c t i = (H t )
; and agents take H t as given, it is su¢ cient to show that
When l t i ! !; both c t i and
are strictly positive.
If s > 1;to require (7.5) is equivalent to require that 
Let us see that, also in this case, (7.4) holds because it can be written as
When l t i ! !; the …rst term converges to zero and the second term converges to 1. Consequently, (7.4) holds.
Thus, for any s 2 (0; 1); in equilibriuml t i < !:
Secondly, let us show under which conditions l t i = 0 for all i is not an equilibrium. To show that is enough to prove that when l t j = 0 for all j 6 = i;
that is,
If s > 1;to require (7.12) is equivalent to require that
By plugging (7.2) and (7.3) stated in the proof of Proposition 1 into (7.13), we get,
Thus if ( s 1 s ) < 1 and > 0; when l t i ! 0; H t i ! 0 and (7.11) holds. If s < 1;we can write (7.12) as A + B as in (7.7) and (7.8) . Note that lim l t i !0 B = 0; and A can be written as
The …rst term converges to Finally, when s ! 1; the utility function is Cobb-Douglas as in (7.9) . Let us see that, also in this case, (7.11) holds because it can be written as in (7.10) where the second term converges to zero when l t i ! 0; and the …rst term converges to zero if ( 1+ ) 1 > 0; and converges to +1 if ( 1+ ) 1 < 0: In any case, (7.11) holds.
Summarizing, if ( s 1 s ) < 1 and > 0, the short run equilibrium is interior Proof of Proposition 3. The transition function (3.4) can be written implicitly as
Clearly, at (Ĥ;Ĥ) we have that (Ĥ;Ĥ) = 0: Furthermore, @ (Ĥ;Ĥ)=@H t > 0 because,
and s(1 ) + > 0 given that (
which implies that H t is an increasing function of H t 1 in any rectangular domain:
Finally, let us see that
< 1 if and only if s < 1: Note that
that is, if and only if, s < 1: Furthermore, since H t is an increasing function of H t 1 ; with a unique …xed point, the …xed point is also globally stable.
ThatĤ is increasing with !, , and when s < 1 follows directly from (3.6).
Proof of Proposition 4. Instability when s > 1 follows from Proposition 3. ThatĤ is decreasing with !, , and when s > 1 follows directly from (3.6). In order to show the last part of the proposition, note that the transition function can be written as
Which in terms of the growth rate, 1 + g t = H t =H t 1 ; can be written as follows
The left hand side of (7.15) is increasing in g t but decreasing in H t because s > 1. Therefore, if
Thus, if H 0 >Ĥ; when t ! 1, H t ! 1; and
which implies that g t tends to ! 1:
In the proof of Proposition 5 we use Berge maximum theorem (Berge 1963). For completeness, we recall the version of the theorem that we are using here.
Note that when = 0; the growth rate coincides with the growth rate obtained with the linear transition function in Section 3, namely ! =(1 + ):
For > 0; let us see under which conditions a solution to (7.17) exists.
The derivative of the left hand side of (7.17) with respect to G is 1 + ( 1+ + 1) G 1+ ;
which has the following properties: 1) It is zero for a unique value of G, namelŷ
2) For values of G less (resp. more) than this value the left hand side of (7.17) is increasing (resp. decreasing) with respect to G: Therefore, the left hand side of (7.17) is strictly concave with respect to G . Note that (7.17) has a solution if and only if the left hand side of (7.17) evaluated atĜ is greater or equal than ! ; that is,
(ii) Note that the left hand side of (7.17) is strictly concave on G because the second derivative is negative. Thus, generically, there are two values of G which solve this equation. We will end this proof by showing that only the smallest root is a solution to our problem.
Note that the one period utility function can be written as
Let us write the previous equation as V (H t 1 i ; H t i ; H t ). Given that we are assuming that the growth rate of human capital is constant, the intertemporal utility function can be written as We know that at = 0; the solution is such that G <Ĝ (this is the case where the equation (7.17) only has one solution). If for some s the maximum root of (7.17) were a solution, then it can be proved that the correspondence G( ) will fail to be upper hemi-continuous, contradicting
Berge theorem.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that, since l t i < !; G < !: Let us write (7. we see that they are identical when = and it is independent on :
